Microeconomic_Theory_MWG

Contents
... Preface xi11
PART ONE: INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING 3
Chapter 1. Preference and Choice 5
l.A Introduction 5
l.B Preference Relations 6
l.C Choice Rules 9
1.D The Relationship between Preference Relations and Choice Rules 11
Exercises 15
Chapter 2. Consumer Choice 17
2.A Introduction 17
2.B . Commodities 17
2.C The Consumption Set 18
2.D ' Competitive Budgets 20
2.E Demand Functions and Comparative Statics 23
2.F The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Law of Demand 28
Exercises 36
Chapter 3. Classical Demand Theory 40
Introduction 40
Preference Relations: Basic Properties 41
Preference and Utility 46
The Utility Maximization .Problem 50
The Expenditure Minimization problem 57
Duality: A Mathematical Introduction 63
Relationships between Demand, Indirect Utility, and Expenditure Functions 67
Integrability 75
Welfare Evaluation of Economic Changes 80
The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference 91
Appendix A: Continuity and Differentiability Properties of Walrasian Demand 92
Exercises 96
Chapter 4. Aggregate Demand 105
4.A Introduction 105
4.B Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Wealth 106
viii C O N T E N T S
4.C Aggregate Demand and the Weak Axiom 109
4.D Aggregate Demand and the Existence of a Representative Consumer 116
Appendix A: Regularizing Effects of Aggregation 122
Exercises 123
Chapter 5. Production 127
5.A Introduction 127
5.B Production Sets 128
5.C Profit Maximization and Cost Minimization 135
5.D The Geometry of Cost and Supply in the Single-Output Case 143
5.E Aggregation 147
5.F Efficient Production 149
5.G Remarks on the Objectives of the Firm 152
~ ~ p e n dAi x: T he Linear Activity Mod.el 154
Exercises 160
Chapter 6. Choice Under Uncertainty 167
6.A Introduction 167
6.B Expected Utility Theory 168
6.C Money Lotteries and Risk Aversion 183
6.D Comparison of Payoff Distributions in Terms of Return and Risk 194
6.E State-dependent Utility 199
6.F Subjective Probability Theory 205
Exercises 208
PART TWO:' GAME THEORY 217
Chapter 7. Basic Elements of Noncooperative Games 219
7.A Introduction 219
7.B What Is a Game? 219
7.C The Extensive Form Representation of a Game 221
7.D Strategies and the Normal Form Representation of a Game 228
7.E Randomized Choices 231
Exercises 233
Chapter 8. Simultaneous-Move Games 235
8.A Introduction 235
8.B Dominant and Dominated Strategies 236
8.C Rationalizable Strategies 242
8.D Nash Equilibrium 246
8.E Games of Incomplete Information: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium 253
8.F The Possibility of Mistakes: Trembling-Hand Perfection 258
Appendix A: Existence of Nash Equilibrium 260
Exercises 262
C O N T E N T S ix
Chapter 9. Dynamic Games 267
9.A Introduction 267
9.B Sequential Rationality, Backward Induction, and Subgame Perfection 268
9.C Beliefs and Sequential Rationality 282
9.D Reasonable Beliefs and Forward Induction 292
Appendix A: Finite and Infinite Horizon Bilateral Bargaining 296
Appendix B: Extensive Form Trembling-Hand Perfect Nash Equilibrium 299
Exercises 301
PART THREE: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM AND MARKET FAILURE 307
Chapter 10. Competitive Markets 31 1
10.A Introduction 31 1
10.B Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibria 312
10.C Partial Equilibrium Competitive Analysis 316
10.D The Fundamental Welfare Theorems in a Partial Equilibrium Context 325
10.E Welfare Analysis in the Partial Equilibrium Model 328
10.F Free-Entry and Long-Run Competitive Equilibria . 334
10.G Concluding Remarks on Partial Equilibrium Analysis 341
Exercises 344
Chapter 11. Externalities and Public Goods 350
1 l.A Introduction 350
ll.B A Simple Bilateral Externality 351
11 .C Public Goods 359
11 .D Multilateral Externalities 364
1 l.E Private Information and Second-Best Solutions 368
Appendix A: Nonconvexities and the Theory of Externalities 374
Exercises 378
Chapter 12. Market Power 383
12.A Introduction 383
12.B Monopoly Pricing 384
12.C Static Models of Oligopoly 387
12.D Repeated Interaction 400
12.E Entry 405
12.F The Competitive Limit 41 1
12.G Strategic Precommitments to Affect Future Competition 414
Appendix A: Infinitely Repeated Games and the Folk Theorem 417
Appendix B: Strategic Entry Deterrence and Accommodation 423
Exercises 428
Chapter 13. Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening 436
13.A Introduction 436
13.B Informational Asymmetries and Adverse Selection 437
13.C Signaling 450
13.D Screening 460
Appendix A: Reasonable-Beliefs Refinements in Signaling Games 467
Exercises 473
Chapter 14. The Principal-Agent Problem 477
14.A Introduction 477
14.B Hidden Actions (Moral Hazard) 478
14.C Hidden Information (and Monopolistic Screening) 488
14.D Hidden Actions and Hidden Information: Hybrid Models 501
Appendix A: Multiple Effort Levels in the Hidden Action Model 502
Appendix B: A Formal Solution of the Principal-Agent Problem with Hidden Information 504
Exercises 507
PART FOUR: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 511
Chapter 15. General Equilibrium Theory: Some Examples 5 15
15.A Introduction 515
15.B Pure Exchange: The Edgeworth Box 515
15.C The One-Consumer, One-Producer Economy 525
15.D The 2 x 2 Production Model 529
15.E General Versus Partial Equilibrium Theory 538
Exercises 540
Chapter 16. Equilibrium and Its Basic Welfare Properties 545
16.A Introduction 545
16.B The Basic Model and Definitions 546
16.C The First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 549
16.D The Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics 551
16.E Pareto Optimality and Social Welfare Optima 558
16.F First-Order Conditions for Pareto Optimality 561
16.G Some Applications 566
Appendix A: Technical Properties of the Set of Feasible Allocations 573
Exercises 575
Chapter 17. The Positive Theory of Equilibrium 578
17.A Introduction 578
17.B Equilibrium: Definitions and Basic Equations 579
17.C Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium 584
C O N T E N T S xi
17.D Local Uniqueness and the Index Theorem 589
17.E Anything Goes: The Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu Theorem 598
17.F Uniqueness of Equilibria 606
17.G Comparative Statics Analysis 616
17.H Thtonnement Stability 620
17.1 Large Economies and Nonconvexities 627
Appendix A: Characterizing Equilibrium through Welfare Equations 630
Appendix B: A General Approach to the Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium 632
Exercises 641
Chapter 18. Some Foundations for Competitive Equilibria 652
18.A Introduction 652
18.B Core and Equilibria 652
18.C Noncooperative Foundations of Walrasian Equilibria 660
18.D The Limits to Redistribution 665
18.E Equilibrium and the Marginal Productivity Principle 670
Appendix A: Cooperative Game Theory 673
Exercises 684
Chapter 19. General Equilibrium Under Uncertainty 687
19.A Introduction 687
19.B A Market Economy with Contingent Commodities: Description -688
19.C Arrow-Debreu Equilibrium 69 1
19.D Sequential Trade 694
19.E Asset Markets 699
19.F Incomplete Markets 709
19.G Firm Behavior in General Equilibrium Models Under Uncertainty 713
19.H Imperfect Information 716
Exercises 725
Chapter 20. Equilibrium and Time 732
20.A Introduction 732
20.B Intertemporal Utility 733
20.C Intertemporal Production and Efficiency 736
20.D Equilibrium: The One-Consumer Case 743
20.E Stationary Paths, Interest Rates, and Golden Rules 754
20.F Dynamics 759
20.G Equilibrium: Several Consumers 765
20.H Overlapping Generations 769
20.1 Remarks'on Nonequilibrium Dynamics: Thtonnement and Learning 778
Exercises 782
xii C O N T E N T S
PART FIVE: WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INCENTIVES 787
Chapter 21. Social Choice Theory 789
21.A Introduction 789
21.B A Special Case: Social Preferences over Two Alternatives 790
21.C The General Case: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem 792
21.D Some Possibility Results: Restricted Domains 799
21.E Social Choice Functions 807
Exercises 812
Chapter 22. Elements of Welfare Economics and Axiomatic Bargaining 817
22.A Introduction 817
22.B Utility Possibility Sets 818
22.C Social Welfare Functions and Social Optima 825
22.D Invariance Properties of Social Welfare Functions 831
22.E The Axiomatic Bargaining Approach 838
22.F Coalitional Bargaining: The Shapley Value 846
Exercises 850
Chapter 23. Incentives and Mechanism Design 857
23.A Introduction 857
23.B The Mechanism Design Problem 858
23.C Dominant Strategy Implementation 869
23.D Bayesian Implementation 883
23.E Participation Constraints 89 1
23.F Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms 897
Appendix A: Implementation and Multiple Equilibria 910
Appendix B: Implementation in Environments with Complete Information 912
Exercises 9 18
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX 926
Matrix Notation for Derivatives 926
Homogeneous Functions and Euler's Formula 928
Concave and Quasiconcave Functions 930
Matrices: Negative (Semi)Definiteness and Other Properties 935
The Implicit Function Theorem 940
Continuous Functions and Compact Sets 943
Convex Sets and Separating Hyperplanes 946
Correspondences 949
Fixed Point Theorems 952
Unconstrained Maximization 954
Constrained Maximization 956
The Envelope Theorem 964
Linear Programming 966
Dynamic Programming 969

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